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CRAFT BEER DRINKERS REIGNITE
THE WINE WARS
Shirley Chen

INTRODUCTION

T

he rise of craft beers draws attention back to the longstanding debate surrounding state law regulations on the direct
shipment of alcohol to consumers across state lines. 1 At the forefront of this debate is the ever-existing tension between the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 Specifically, the issue was pronounced
during what was known as the wine wars of the 1990s and
2000s. 3 Although the United States Supreme Court seemingly settled the matter in the seminal case of Granholm v. Heald, 4 subsequent case holdings have illustrated that confusion surrounding
the extent of the states’ power in alcohol regulation still exists and
that the courts’ decisions are dependent upon a narrow or broad
interpretation of Granholm. 5 For example, state regulations that
do not forbid, but rather limit the scope of producers’ ability to
directly ship wine have been questioned on the same constitu-
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Daniel Fromson, Beer’s Black Market, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/beers-blackmarket/2011/09/01/gIQAsL0D7J_story.html.
2
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; See also
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005); Kevin C. Quigley, Note, Uncorking Granholm: Extending The Nondiscrimination Principle To All Interstate
Commerce In Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871, 1873-74 (2011).
3
William Echikson et al., Wine War, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept.
2, 2001), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2001-09-02/wine-war.
4
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466 (holding that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize or permit laws that violate the Commerce Clause).
5
Quigley, supra note 2, at 1888-93; William C. Green, Creating A Common Market For Wine: Boutique Wines, Direct Shipment, And State Alcohol
Regulation, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 42 (2012).

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 96 Side B

J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 97 Side A

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Chen Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

5/21/2014 2:42 PM

Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars

527

6

C M
Y K

06/02/2014 15:10:17

See Green, supra note 5, at 43.
Quigley, supra note 2, at 1904; See also Desireé C. Slaybaugh, A Twisted
Vine: The Aftermath Of Granholm v. Heald, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 265,
278-82 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of “shippers” in its opinion showed its intent to apply the holding beyond the producer level of the
three-tier system).
8
Green, supra note 5, at 60.
9
See
BREWERS
ASS’N,
History
of
Craft
Brewing,
http://www.brewersassociation.com/pages/about-us/history-of-craft-brewing
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
7
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tional grounds, resulting in a circuit split. 6 In addition, wine retailers continue to advocate that the Supreme Court’s holding in
Granholm likewise extends to them, not just to wine producers. 7
These ambiguities in the law, which have yet to be resolved following the wine wars, illustrate the uphill battle that the craft
beer industry has to look forward to in addition to some unique
nuances of beer regulation.
This Article not only discusses the still present debate regarding direct shipment of alcohol to consumers, but also why the
trend in the popularity of craft beers, coupled with the evergrowing strength of e-commerce, has made it imperative to settle
this dispute. In particular, this Article highlights the consumer
impact of state alcohol regulations and the dangers posed by the
efforts to diminish or even eliminate the effects of Granholm’s
original holding.
Part One of this Article will discuss a brief history of alcohol regulation in the United States, beginning with the passage of
the Twenty-first Amendment and the states’ creation of the
three-tier regulatory system following the Amendment’s enactment. It then explores the system’s contention with the Commerce Clause in determining the extent to which states can regulate alcohol across interstate boundaries in the context of the wine
industry. Next, it explains the culmination of the wine wars in
Granholm. And lastly, this part highlights subsequent interpretations of the case to show how Granholm has not been the peace
treaty for which consumers, producers, retailers, and wholesalers
had hoped. 8
Part Two addresses the history and growth of the craft
beer industry and culture. 9 Particularly, it draws parallels to the
growth of boutique wineries in the late 1990s and early 2000s in
conjunction with the rise of e-commerce.
Part Three explains the regulations that currently exist in
the shipment of craft beers and how it differs from present regu-
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lations surrounding wine shipments. In addition, it introduces
another barrier to state regulation and consumer protection
through the phenomenon of a black market for beer through Internet purchases. Thus, this section identifies precisely why
changes in state regulations matter in the context of consumer
choice and consumer protection.
Finally, Part Four proposes a settlement between the
longstanding dispute and the overall benefits this settlement
would provide consumers.

I. BACKGROUND: BRIEF HISTORY OF ALCOHOL
REGULATION SINCE PROHIBITION
A. Twenty-first Amendment and the Three-tier System
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See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; See also Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy
J. Painter, Why We Control Alcohol the Way We Do, in SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 1, 8 (Carole J. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008).
11
Id.
12
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; See also WINE AND SPIRITS DISTRIB. OF
ILL., REGULATION OF BEVERAGE ALCOHOL IN ILLINOIS: UNDERSTANDING
THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM (2011).
13
Evan T. Lawson, The Future of the Three-Tiered System as a Control of
Marketing Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF
ALCOHOL: THE 21ST AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 31, 104 (Carole J.
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Prohibition officially ended with the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment through the passage of the Twenty-first
Amendment. 10 As such, the future of regulation had to address
the issues that Prohibition had attempted but failed to attack. For
example, while Prohibition sought to conform to social and moral
attitudes towards the evils of excessive alcohol consumption, it
not only failed in its original goals but also sparked a complex
and expansive crime network throughout the country. 11 Accordingly, the Twenty-first Amendment left control to the states to determine a regulatory system with the idea that the state could better tackle the concerns that prompted Prohibition in the first
place as well as the unfortunate by-products of that era. 12 States
were now charged with the task of reducing, if not eliminating
the abuse of alcohol consumption, eradicating all forms of lawlessness associated with the sale of alcohol that dominated the
Prohibition era, and regulating alcohol within the state in an appropriate, efficient, and effective manner. 13
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Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008).
14
Jurkiewicz, supra note 10, at 6.
15
Id. at 6-7.
16
Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 265-66.
17
Id.
18
FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO ECOMMERCE: WINE 6 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftcstaff-report-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commercewine/winereport2.pdf.
19
WINE AND SPIRITS DISTRIB. OF ILL., supra note 12.
20
Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 266.
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Thus emerged the three-tier system. Prior to Prohibition,
vertical integration often occurred in which producers of alcohol
were either the retailers themselves or yielded significant control
over them. 14 In fact, many of the moral evils that Prohibition
sought to combat were attributed to this vertically integrated system because there was a perception that producer-retailers in a
free market system encouraged large amounts of alcohol consumption and indulgence to increase profits at whatever social
costs. 15 After the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment, states
implemented a three-tier system, adding a wholesaler level to insulate producers from retailers. Not only did the three-tier system
address the concerns of excessive alcohol consumption, but it also
attacked Prohibition’s criminal networks that arose. 16 By separating the production end from the retail end, the system aimed to
curtail bootleg sales of wine 17 and reinforce a state controlled regulatory scheme to keep alcohol distribution out of the hands of
organized crime. 18 Currently, states like Illinois propose in its informational pamphlet, “Wine and Spirits Distrib. of Ill., Regulation of Beverage Alcohol in Illinois: Understanding the ThreeTier System” that the three-tier system accomplishes a variety of
goals: “To ensure and maximize verifiable tax revenues that can
be collected efficiently from the beverage alcohol industry. To facilitate state and local control of alcoholic beverages. To encourage moderate, legal consumption. [And] [t]o provide an orderly,
effective market.” 19
In practice, the producer sells the alcohol to the wholesaler, which in turn distributes and sells it to the retailer. Finally, the
retailer markets and sells the alcohol to the consumer. The sale
and purchase of the alcohol is taxed at each level, increasing the
price of the final product that the consumer eventually purchases. 20
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21
James A. Tanford, E-Commerce In Wine, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 275,
303 (2006).
22
FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Tanford, supra note 21, at 303-04.
26
FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 7-8.
27
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473.
28
Id. at 8.
29
Id.
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Under the traditional three-tier system, all wine produced
must go through the several different layers and pass through
several hands to finally reach the consumer. As the number of
wineries began to expand exponentially in the 1990s and early
2000s, the number of wholesalers decreased to only one-sixth of
that number in the 1960s. 21 The three-tier system thus became
more burdensome on new wineries entering the market. Because
of the limited number of wholesalers, smaller wineries had a
much harder time adhering to the regulatory system, since many
wholesalers found it costly and uneconomical to carry some of the
smaller wineries’ labels. 22 Furthermore, there was no guarantee
that retailers would likewise make room for those labels on their
shelves. 23
While the situation seemed to be a lost cause for emerging
boutique wineries, the increasing trend of the Internet sale of
commodities, or e-commerce, provided new possibilities for both
producers and consumers. 24 Additionally, some states began allowing interstate direct shipment to consumers beginning in
1986 25 with certain limitations. For instance, most states that allowed direct shipment did so with the requirement of reciprocity,
which allowed out-of-state direct shipment of wines into their
state only if the exporting states reciprocated by allowing the
former states’ direct shipments as well. 26 For example, beginning
in 1986, California had a reciprocity arrangement with several
states. 27 In essence, California allowed direct shipment from these
states while these states would afford the same privilege of direct
shipments from California. However, most of these states put
caps on the volume of wine shipments that a consumer could receive from anywhere. 28 Conversely, some states chose not to allow
any form of interstate direct shipments – few even making it a
felony to do so. 29
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Many of the states’ logic behind regulating wine markets
was to protect the competitive advantage of the local wineries. 30
By allowing direct shipment of out-of-state wine to consumers,
states also feared the potential difficulty of collecting taxes in addition to the potential loss of tax revenue through bypassing the
three-tier system. 31 Some states made an exception by allowing
direct shipments only from wineries within their borders but prohibiting out-of-state direct shipment. 32 This discrepancy brought
a series of court cases challenging these regulations, which culminated in the Supreme Court case of Granholm v. Heald.
C. Granholm: Analysis of the Court’s Decision & Subsequent
Interpretations
1. Granholm

30
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Quigley, supra note 2, at 1184-85.
Id. at 1185; FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 8.
32
FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 3 (stating that in 2003, “more than half
the states prohibit or severely restrict out-of-state suppliers from shipping wine
directly to consumers” but “many of these same states, however, allow intrastate direct shipping, such as from in-state wineries and retailers”).
33
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 468-72 (discussing the background and procedural history of the suit in Michigan and the suit in New York).
34
Id. at 469.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 470.
31
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The Supreme Court determined the validity of two state
laws regulating direct shipment of alcohol that treated local wineries differently from out-of-state wineries. 33 In Michigan, the direct-shipment law at issue specifically required wine producers to
go through wholesalers with the exception of Michigan’s in-state
wineries. 34 In particular, only in-state producers could obtain a
license to directly ship to consumers within the state. 35 Furthermore, while a small winery could obtain a license for $25, an outof-state producer had to apply and pay $300 for a license to sell,
and even then it could only sell to in-state wholesalers rather than
consumers. 36 New York’s licensing scheme also followed a threetier regulatory system but did not explicitly forbid an out-of-state
wine producer from direct shipment to in-state consumers. Instead, it required an out-of-state winery to become a licensed
New York winery first. 37 In practice, an out-of-state winery
would have to establish a separate branch or some sort of legal
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Id.; Quigley, supra note 2, at 1885.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474.
40
Id. at 471.
41
Id. at 472; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-326 (1979).
42
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
43
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
624 (1978).
44
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
45
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
46
Id.; North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1986).
39

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 99 Side B

entity within the state of New York. 38 The Court recognized from
the outset that New York’s law was an “indirect way of subjecting out-of-state wineries, but not local ones, to the three-tier system.” 39
Ultimately, the Court had to decide whether “a State’s
regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship
alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violates the dormant Commerce Clause in light of §
2 of the Twenty-first Amendment?” 40 The Commerce Clause had
historical roots in the Framer’s desire to ensure that the division
and disconnected relationships that troubled the Colonies and
States under the Articles of Confederation would not continue in
the creation of the Union. 41 Thus, the Commerce Clause served a
purpose of preventing states from discriminating against one another in order to favor their own citizens or benefit their own
economic interests at the expense of that of another state. 42 Ordinarily, any state law that violated this principle was per se invalid.43 However, the Supreme Court had to confront the existence
of the Twenty-first Amendment to inform its understanding of
the application of the Commerce Clause in the context of alcohol
regulation.
§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment explicitly states: “The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in the violation of laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” 44
States argued that because the Amendment gave them power to
regulate alcohol, delivery into the state in violation of the states’
regulatory laws would be an explicit violation of the Amendment,
ultimately calling into question whether the three-tier regulatory
system was constitutional. 45 In addition, the Court had previously
recognized in North Dakota v. United States that the three-tier
system was “unquestionably legitimate.” 46 However, the Supreme
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Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
Id.; New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
49
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 331 (2007); Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 270.
50
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489; Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 270.
51
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
52
Id. at 490.
53
Id.
54
Id.; FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 12.
55
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490-91. See also FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at
38-40 (recommending safeguards against direct shipment of alcohol to minors,
including requiring adult signature and presentation of valid identification upon delivery, providing adequate training to delivery companies, and increasing
penalties for any shippers that violate regulations set forth to further this interest such as revocation of a license).
48
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Court in Granholm held that while the three-tier system was legitimate, it still could not violate the Commerce Clause; instead, it
would only be respected and protected by § 2 when it treated alcohol the same across the board, whether it was produced out-ofstate or domestically. 47
Thus, the Court then turned its analysis to whether the
laws did in fact violate the Commerce Clause by determining
whether the state, through its regulations, “advances a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 48 Otherwise, the discriminatory
law is invalid due to its motivation of “simple economic protectionism.” 49 Among the legitimate reasons that the state proffered
that its laws directly addressed were concerns regarding (1) sale
to minors and (2) tax collection from out-of-state shippers. 50
The Court found unpersuasive the states’ argument that
the laws at issue aimed to prevent the sale of alcohol to minors.
The states contended that direct shipment would provide an easier method for minors to access alcohol by just needing a credit
card and the Internet. 51 Primarily, the Court took issue with the
idea that a law that prevented an out-of-state producer from directly shipping to consumers would better prevent minors from
accessing alcohol when the law still allowed in-state direct shipment. 52 Furthermore, the Court noted that even in states that allowed direct shipment, there were no reports that minors were
able to access alcohol more easily. 53 Minors, in general, were not
likely to consume wine or wait several days for it to arrive. 54 Finally, there were many less restrictive means to minimize the
problem including requiring an adult signature upon delivery. 55
The states’ second contention that the law addressed the
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states’ legitimate interest in tax collection was likewise insufficient. This argument fell flat on its face in the Michigan case,
primarily because tax collection occurs directly when out-of-state
alcohol enters the state rather than relying on wholesalers to collect the tax. 56 Thus, the court suggested that safeguards through
licensing and self-reporting should be adequate for tax collection
on direct shipments from out-of-state. 57 While New York’s tax
collection practices may have more justification, the Court found
that there were less restrictive means to achieve their regulatory
objective. 58 For example, New York could implement a requirement of a permit for direct shipment and recuperate any potential
lost tax revenue. 59 Furthermore, studies have shown that most of
the states that have allowed direct shipment from out-of-state
suppliers have had little to no problems with the collection of excise taxes. 60 Ultimately, the Court respected the states’ interests in
regulating distribution of alcohol in the interest of “facilitating
orderly market conditions, protecting public health and safety,
and ensuring regulatory accountability” but by less restrictive
means that were not discriminatory to out-of-state businesses. 61
2. Subsequent Confusion
a. Granholm’s reach – inclusive or exclusive?

56
57
58

60
61
62

06/02/2014 15:10:17

59

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 38.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491.
Quigley, supra note 2, at 1890.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 100 Side B

Granholm was a victory in some sense for boutique wineries that wished to directly ship to some states that had allowed instate direct shipment and forbidden out-of-state direct shipment.
However, there was still confusion as to whether the nondiscriminatory ideals that Granholm set forth were limited to wineries or
whether all levels of the three-tier system, specifically retailers,
deserved the same protection. 62
A view of an expanded scope of Granholm would allow retailers the same protection that producers received from the Supreme Court’s ruling. The Eastern District Court of Michigan
followed the same reasoning and analysis that the Supreme Court
applied in Granholm and found discriminatory the statute that
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prohibited out-of-state retailers from direct shipment while allowing in-state direct shipment. Furthermore, it also found that the
state’s proffered justifications were not sufficient. 63
However, the proponents of a narrow reading of
Granholm, primarily wholesalers and state regulatory bodies, 64
argued that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the “unquestionabl[e] legitima[cy]” 65 of the three-tier system intended to limit the
scope of the holding to producers. 66 Thus, while direct shipment
by producers was an exception to that system, the same exception
could not be afforded to retailers. 67 The Second and Fifth Circuits
adopted this narrow reading of Granholm that statutes allowing
in-state retailers to directly ship to consumers while preventing
out-of-state retailers from doing so were constitutional.68
b. Regulatory loopholes

63
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See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1037 (E.D.
Mich. 2008); Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 275.
64
Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 281.
65
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
66
Quigley, supra note 2, at 1892-93; Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 273.
67
Quigley, supra note 2, at 1893.
68
See Arnold’s Wine, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 192 (2nd Cir. 2009);
Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010).
69
Green, supra note 5, at 39-42.
70
Tanford, supra note 21, at 322.
71
Id.; Green, supra note 5, at 39.
72
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
73
Tanford, supra note 21, at 323.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 101 Side A

Subsequent to the decision in Granholm, some states were
directly affected by its ruling and had to make immediate changes
in their laws while some states that had banned all direct shipment (both in and out-of-state) were unaffected.69 The states that
were affected had three options in modifying their laws: leveling
up, leveling down, or leveling sideways.70 With such a process,
the next issue of confusion centered on laws that were nondiscriminatory on their face but were potentially discriminatory in
effect.
In order to level up, states that had previously allowed instate direct shipment and prohibited out-of-state direct shipment
now allowed any wine producer to obtain a state direct shipping
permit. 71 In such cases, state concerns regarding sale of alcohol to
minors, as expressed in Granholm, 72 were addressed through less
restrictive means, primarily through requirements of the permit. 73
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74
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178:14-a (2006); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
23661.3 (2006).
75
Tanford, supra note 21, at 323.
76
Id.
77
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474-75 (finding New York’s requirement that an
out-of-state winery have a branch office in the state as effectively barring that
winery from the market); Tanford, supra note 21, at 323.
78
Tanford, supra note 21, at 324.
79
Although theoretically, a consumer can save some costs by ordering in
large quantities to bring back, some states have limits upon how much an individual is allowed to bring back across the state’s boundaries. E.g. Ind. Code
§ 7.1-5-11-15 (2006).
80
Tanford, supra note 21, at 324.
81
Id. at 325.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 101 Side B

For example, New Hampshire and California statutes stated that
any direct shipments of wine required the presentation of identification to the shipper in order to verify the age of the adult signatory receiving the package and filing periodic reports with the
regulatory agency of the state. 74
Other states that had not explicitly prohibited out-of-state
direct shipment leveled up in the way that they regulated out-ofstate direct shipment because the implementations of some of the
laws that were not discriminatory on their face were so in practice. 75 These included permit costs, case limits and production
limits. 76 In essence, if a state that had regulations that made the
process for an out-of-state winery to obtain a permit so burdensome or expensive to the point where it realistically excluded
them from the market, Granholm held that this was a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause. 77
In order to level down, states prohibited all directshipments so that none of their state consumers could order any
alcohol on the Internet. 78 Thus, wine drinkers were left to only
purchase wines face to face at a retail store. In order to obtain
out-of-state wine, they were essentially required to travel to the
actual state that the wine was sold. Furthermore, because this
was not a likely situation in which a consumer would travel thousands of miles just to obtain a bottle or even a case of wine, 79 this
still discriminated against out-of-state wineries. 80
The third phenomenon was a sort of leveling sideways.
Some states began allowing direct shipment but required that the
purchase order was face-to-face, typically at the physical winery’s
premises. 81 Again, this allowed access to out-of-state wines only to
those who had the means to travel to the actual wineries. As a result, local markets were still essentially closed off except for those
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See Green, supra note 5, at 42-54 (discussing the following cases in
greater detail).
83
Id. at 42.
84
See Baude v. Heath (Baude II), 538 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2008).
85
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (establishing
the test that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”).
86
Green, supra note 5, at 45.
87
Id. at 46.
88
Id.; Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly (Cherry Hill Vineyards II), 553
F.3d 423, 433 (6th Cir. 2008); Quigley, supra note 2, at 46.
89
Green, supra note 5, at 46-47.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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few that traveled.
These changes in laws after Granholm created confusion
as to whether the Supreme Court truly resolved the tension between the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
Not surprisingly, cases were filed to test whether revised direct
shipment legislation adhered to Granholm and the Commerce
Clause. 82 Specifically at issue were the case limits, production
caps, and on-site purchase requirements, which circuits have analyzed differently, coming to opposing conclusions. 83 The Seventh
Circuit in Baude II (2008) 84 applied the Pike balancing test used
in Dormant Commerce Clause cases 85 to determine the constitutionality of the on-site purchase requirement. 86 The Seventh Circuit found that the requirement was only an incidental burden to
small out-of-state wineries and that the interest of the state was
greater in ensuring age verification for alcohol purchases. 87 Thus,
the provision requiring face-to-face onsite purchase as a prerequisite to direct shipment was constitutional.
The Sixth Circuit, however, determined that on-site purchase provisions did in fact burden out-of-state wineries in Cherry Hill Vineyards II (2008). 88 The court pointed to the fact that
customers had to travel far distances just to purchase the wine of
another state. 89 Furthermore, while in-state wineries would benefit from direct shipment, wholesalers also benefitted because outof-state wineries were likely to only sell wine through the threetier system. 90 The court further found unpersuasive the state’s interest in combating underage purchases when there were less restrictive means to do so such as delivery requirements of age verification. 91
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II. CRAFT BEER TAKES CENTER STAGE
While craft beers are abundant today, light lager beers
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See Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins (Family Winemakers II), 592
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2010); Green, supra note 5, at 49-51.
93
Green, supra note 5, at 49-51.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver (Black Star Farms II), 600 F.3d
1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010).
98
Green, supra note 5, at 54.
99
Id.
100
Id.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 102 Side B

The First Circuit addressed the provisions dealing with
production caps in Family Winemakers II (2010). 92 Some states
like Massachusetts had production caps that allowed direct
shipment only from small wineries. 93 For instance, in Massachusetts, where the majority of wineries were relatively small, the
legislature passed a statute that was facially neutral to both outof-state and in-state wineries. 94 The First Circuit determined that
it was discriminatory in effect when looking at the facts specific
to the wine industry of Massachusetts. 95 The law included all of
the Massachusetts wineries while excluding 607 out-of-state wineries that did not meet the threshold (which was 98% of the nationwide production). 96
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit in Black Star Farms II (2010) 97
found that production caps as laid out by an Arizona statute were
not unconstitutional.98 The court focused on the fact that small
wineries across the board benefited from a less restrictive method
of distribution while large wineries were incidentally affected. 99
Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiffs had not substantially proven the posited discriminatory effects. 100
With all of these inconsistencies throughout the different
circuits regarding whether retailers are extended the same protections that producers received, and whether facially nondiscriminatory laws are sufficient to surpass constitutional muster, it is
not hard to see that wine drinkers today are still not afforded all
of the benefits that direct shipment can provide. Furthermore, it
is a telling tale of the uphill battle that craft breweries, that have
not necessarily been explicitly afforded Granholm protections as
wine makers, have in the realm of state regulation in alcohol.
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See BREWERS ASS’N, American Craft Brewer Modern History,
http://www.brewersassociation.com/pages/about-us/history-of-craft-brewing
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Craft Brewer Mod. Hist.].
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Id.
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Id.
104
Id.; See also MAREEN OGLE, AMBITIOUS BREW: THE STORY OF
AMERICAN BEER 291-99 (2006).
105
BREWERS
ASS’N,
Craft
Brewer
Defined,
http://www.brewersassociation.com/pages/business-tools/craft-brewingstatistics/craft-brewer-defined (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
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Craft Brewer Mod. Hist., supra note 101.
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See
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Brewing
Facts,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/pages/business-tools/craft-brewingstatistics/facts (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Craft Brewing Facts].
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dominated the beer scene until the late 1970s. 101 Many of these
breweries consolidated to roughly 44 brewing companies. 102
However, as early as 1976, American craft brewing began emerging, creating unique flavors and character. 103 The first recognized
microbrewery, specifically by the Brewer’s Association, was the
New Albion brewery in Sonoma, California. 104 Three specific
characteristics that distinguished a brewery like New Albion
from the large breweries already in the industry were its size
(produced six million barrels of beer or less annually), its independence (more than 75% of the brewery was owned by the craft
brewer himself), and its commitment to tradition (used techniques
to enhance rather than lighten flavors). 105 Although microbreweries did not establish a forceful entry into the market during the
1980s, they did lay a solid foundation and blueprint for other
craft breweries to gain traction in the 1990s. 106 In fact, during the
first half of the 1990s, craft brewing increased in “annual volume
growth increasing from 35% in 1991 increasing each year to a
high of 58% in 1995.” 107 The craft brewing industry momentarily
decelerated between 1997 and 2003 but saw growth again
through today.108
Most recently, the industry saw a growth of 15% by volume and 17% by dollars in 2012 as compared to the previous
year; nearly 409 breweries (310 microbreweries and 99 brewpubs)
opened in 2012 alone. 109 Several trends in popular culture may
contribute to the increasing popularity of craft beers among beer
aficionados. While home brewing of craft beers began as early as
the 1980s, the “do-it-yourself” mentality that has been heavily
prevalent in today’s society has encouraged it as a hobby, increas-
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ing the presence of craft beers in popular culture. 110 Furthermore,
current campaigns to “buy local” whether to support local businesses or for reasons of sustainability have also encouraged the
attractiveness of craft beer. 111 There is some speculation that the
phenomenon of hipsters among the millennial generation could
also be another factor in the growing industry of craft brews. 112

III. CONSUMERS’ NEED FOR PROTECTION
The landscape of the beer industry has changed significantly over the past half-century. After a process of consolidation,
44 large brewing companies dominated the industry by the late
1970s. 113 As a result, many states passed franchise laws as a check
on supplier’s power over wholesalers within the three-tier system. 114 Franchise laws dictate the agreements in which a wholesaler obtains a right to offer and sell the brewer’s product and often require permission from the state to terminate the
relationship.115 While franchise laws were important when macro-breweries dominated the beer scene and wholesale distributors
were mostly family owned businesses, the consolidation of players
on the distribution level has reduced the need for protection. 116
For example, only five main wholesalers control nearly half of all
business done on this level. 117 Thus, the power dynamic has
turned the tide in favor of wholesalers who support and benefit
from the three-tier regulatory system 118 and franchise laws. 119
110
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Taking into account the fact that laws governing alcohol
vary from state to state in general, the laws regarding the sale and
direct shipment of beer is distinct from that of wine. Unless otherwise specified by state law, the principle held in Granholm only
extends to the wine industry while beer shipments are still illegal. 120 Furthermore, as more and more breweries are getting licenses to self-distribute, the issues raised in Granholm regarding
in-state and out-of-state direct shipment are likely to arise again.
Similar concerns among consumers exist as a result of
state restrictions on direct shipment of beer that had existed in
the wine industry prior to Granholm. Here, craft breweries are
experiencing the same difficulties in having some wholesale distributors pick up their label, especially when the distributor is a
“main brand” distributor and is likely to be selective in choosing
which brands to carry. 121 Thus, when a state completely bans direct shipment, both in and out-of-state, craft breweries that cannot be picked up by wholesalers are unable to continue their
business. Even when craft brews are picked up by wholesale distributors and are forced to proceed through the three-tier system,
three specific issues concerning consumer rights are still implicated. First, studies show that consumers denied the option for direct shipment through online purchases will generally pay higher
prices on alcohol due to the multiple layers of tax as well as
wholesaler or retailer mark up.122 Second, when states prohibit
direct shipment through e-commerce, consumer choice greatly
diminishes. Not all retailers will be able to carry a large variety of
craft brews, especially if brewed out-of-state. In studying wines,
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) found that the Internet
offers consumers more variety of boutique wines that were not
available in retail stores like brick-and-mortar stores. 123 In prac-

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 104 Side B

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Chen Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

542

5/21/2014 2:42 PM

Vol. 26:3

124

C M
Y K

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Id. at 17.
Id. at 40.
126
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Beer black market exploits enthusiasts, ignores law, TRIB TOTAL MEDIA (Dec. 6, 2013, 6:18 PM),
http://triblive.com/usworld/nation/5209598-74/beer-brewerybeers#axzz2uLylCMAy.
127
Id.
128
Daniel Fromson, Beer’s Black Market, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 6,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/beers-blackmarket/2011/09/01/gIQAsL0D7J_story.html.
129
KATALIN J. CSERES, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION 169 (2005).
130
Id.
131
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 126.
132
Id.
125

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 104 Side B

tice, allowing out-of-state direct shipment to consumers opens the
geographic market to the consumer. 124 Lastly, consumers have an
interest in the convenience of obtaining products that they have a
legal right to purchase. 125
The traditional issues that affected wine drinkers are not
the only concern that craft beer consumers have to confront. The
rapidly expanding popularity of craft beers has created another
phenomenon as a result of the illegality of direct shipment. In
particular, the heavy use and norm of e-commerce has bred an
underground black market for craft brews. 126 As a result of some
state laws that outright forbid direct shipment of craft beers, consumers have no other alternative but to turn to illegal Internet
commerce as a result of the restriction as well as the impracticality of traveling to other states just to purchase the beverage. 127
Additionally, when the distributors elect to not carry a small label
from out-of-state, consumers are likewise out of luck in obtaining
the brew legally.
The black market circumvents the states’ legitimate right
to regulate alcohol within its borders.128 Furthermore, it implicates significant consumer rights issues. In general, because no
enforceable legal relationship exists between seller and buyer in
an illegal exchange, consumers become vulnerable. 129 First and
most alarmingly, the price for which many of these brews are sold
drastically exceed the market price had direct shipment from outof-state brewers been legal. 130 For example, some craft beers are
routinely resold on eBay for hundreds of dollars. 131 Russian River Brewing in Santa Rosa, California, produces its flagship Pliny
the Elder for five dollars a bottle; on the black market, it can go
for between $15 to $50 per bottle. 132 Specifically, in late 2013, a

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 105 Side A

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Chen Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

5/21/2014 2:42 PM

Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars

543

woman in Vermont was charged with selling on Craigslist five
cases of Heady Topper beer at a whopping price of $825. 133
Although in general, breweries have attempted to discourage such practices by threatening to withhold sales to individuals
that violate these laws, 134 actual enforcement is not likely to occur
and people running makeshift liquor stores on eBay are likely to
continue without any accountability. 135 Brewers that take pride in
their craft brews often do not wish the consumer to suffer from
the inflated costs of their product as a result of a black market exchange. 136 Furthermore, there are serious concerns regarding the
integrity of the product when a third party, who has no expertise
in quality control and the nuances of specific brews, resells it on
the black market. 137 For instance, some beers like hoppy India
pale ales are sensitive to light and heat exposure, which may
cause them to go rancid. 138 Thus, it is in the best interest of all
parties that regulations better attack the root causes of this growing black market.

CONCLUSION
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Tamayo, supra note 116, at 2226.
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As the Supreme Court stated in Granholm, the three-tier
system is “unquestionably legitimate.” 139 This Article does not
suggest that there needs to be an overhaul of the three-tier system, especially when there hasn’t been widespread support of an
absolutely deregulated system. 140 However, the traditional system, coupled with modified regulations after Granholm still present problems for alcohol consumers. This Article argues that the
three-tier regulatory system should be modified in a way that
adopts the interests of the consumers, not necessarily as its only
goal, but definitely at the forefront. As discussed supra in Part III,
opening up direct shipment as an option for craft breweries, allowing them to self-distribute will ultimately give consumers
more choice, better prices, and convenience.
This does not mean, however, that the three-tier regulatory system is useless or counterproductive. In fact, while some
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craft breweries would benefit from direct shipment, other breweries greatly benefit from their partnerships with wholesale distributors, especially when the distributor is experienced in the industry and has the resources to distribute at levels that some small
craft breweries are incapable of doing. 141 Instead, especially in
states that forbid self-distribution and direct shipment, states
need to recognize whether statutes that put significant limitations
on a craft brewery’s ability to sell directly to the consumer actually furthers their state goals.
Specifically in the context of direct shipment, the Supreme
Court has already found that there are safeguards against directly
shipping to minors. Producers can require that delivery services
obtain an adult signature with presentation of valid identification. The FTC has recommended training for all delivery services
to identify labels that require such procedures. In addition, states
can impose and enforce strict penalties when a producer violates
any of these requirements. Furthermore, states that have allowed
out-of-state direct shipment have reported little to no problems
with tax collection. Lastly, a state’s interest should be in line with
the interests of the consumer. Allowing self-distribution as well as
direct shipment for small breweries would directly tackle this
phenomenon of the craft beer black market. Such existence jeopardizes the consumer’s right to reasonable prices as well as the
assurance of quality. As such, state regulations should likewise reflect a desire and need to protect the consumer.
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